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Abstract
This master thesis demonstrates an approach for evaluating and ranking
different implementations of network intrusion detection systems in cloud
environments. The paper will attempt to find what the relevant aspects
of different implementations is, and how to structure this information in
a coherent way so they can be scored and compared. By focusing on the
evaluation process when it comes to protecting cloud environments, the
goal is to produce a tool that will give a use case specific recommendation
of where to place the network intrusion detection system.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Cloud computing represents a major industry today. In 2012 global
spending on cloud services was $110.3B and is expected to grow to $210B
in 2016.[7] It will then represent the bulk of new IT spending.[20] The
economic gain of moving services to the cloud is an important selling point
for businesses and organizations, and is a contributing factor for the sharp
increase in usage.
1.1.1 Cloud Computing
Services are valuable to organizations. It is revenue from these services
they make their income. Any interruption in their ability to offer a service
usually result significant loss of revenue. In cloud environments these are
often web services. Their deployment can often be complicated and not
easily migrated to other infrastructures. Cloud computing has the bene-
fit of rapid scaling of available resources to meet changes in traffic. This
ability to dynamically provision resources is what makes cloud computing
valuable from a cost perspective. Where organizations before had to pro-
vision hardware to account for maximum load on their service, dynamic
scaling allows customers of cloud providers to not pay for more resources
than they need at any given time.
The dynamic provisioning of resources in cloud environments is usu-
ally in the form of virtual machines being added or removed. This makes
the life expectancy of each virtual machine fairly low. Less time is then
dedicated to securing each virtual machine, since such security measures
often requires spending time installing and configuring software. If the
virtual machines are not adequately protected, the security of the service is
reduced.
The state of the art when handling security in cloud environments is
through security groups. Security groups are sets of IP filter rules that
are applied to an instance’s networking. This is close to how a firewall
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operates and provides roughly the same level of protection. Properly
configured security groups limits what kind of traffic that can reach the
virtual machines. However traffic on ports needed for the service to
operate still need to pass through, and there is no guarantee that some of
this traffic is malicious and part of an attack intended to compromise the
service. Security groups can only allow or deny traffic based on type of IP
protocol and target port. There is no inspection of the traffic itself or the
pattern the attack is arriving at. This is a security concern since network
attacks often disguises themselves as legitimate traffic intended for open
ports on the system.
1.1.2 Network Intrusion Detection System
A Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) provides protection in areas
a firewall does not cover. It analyses the network traffic for signs of mali-
cious activity. In cloud environments this is traffic already permitted by
the security group. A combination of a firewall and intrusion detection
software form the basis for a Intrusion Prevention System (IPS). The fire-
wall is here told to drop packets flagged as malicious by the IPS so it never
reaches its destination.
Network Intrusion Detection (NID) is currently not implemented as a
service in popular cloud services such as Amazon EC2[1] or Google Com-
pute Engine.[10] Nor can it be found on the current road map for de-
velopers. This is for various reasons. Clouds are large and complex. There
is an enormous amount of network traffic in data centers hosting cloud ser-
vices. Both internally within the data center and externally to the rest of
the Internet. Implementing NID to cover partial or the whole amount of
network traffic means reserving a substantial amount of resources for that
task. There is also a development and maintenance cost to consider. With a
strict competition on pricing, cloud providers are hesitant to go this route
and offer it for free. To offer it as a service with a fee is another option, but
no major cloud providers has chosen to implement this. There is also pri-
vacy issues regarding having NID inherent in cloud environments. NIDS
usually generate alerts when malicious activity is found. These alerts may
contain private information the user does not want anyone else to see.
Users of cloud environments have the option to implement NID
themselves. Virtual machines running in the cloud can host network
intrusion detection software to protect itself or act as a gateway protecting
other machines. This increases the complexity of the setup and may
conflict with other offered services, such as load balancing. Should the user
choose to implement NID on most or all the running virtual machines, it
will drive the prices up since larger VMs are needed with more memory
and processing power. There is also a performance hit when NIDS is
installed on VMs, so more virtual machines may also be needed. This is
not attractive from a customer point of view.
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1.2 Problem statement
Q1 − How can different implementations of network intrusion detection
systems in cloud environments be evaluated and ranked for specific
use cases?
Different implementations refers to different locations in the cloud in-
frastructure. There are several possible locations in the infrastructure that
NIDS can operate and capture traffic. Only one NIDS will be used in the
different implementations.
To determine which implementation of NIDS in a cloud infrastructure
fits a use case best, the different implementations need to be evaluated.
Evaluation refers to give a score for the different characteristics an imple-
mentation has. This can be positive characteristics such as how much of the
network traffic it is able to capture. Or negative characteristics such as how
much it impacts the performance of the cloud. Once these characteristics
has been scored the different implementations can be ranked against each
other to see which fit a specific use case best.
Use cases is cloud providers that need to decide where in their
infrastructure they should place their network intrusion detection systems.
Two or more alternatives has been found and they need to decide which
one best fits their priorities.
3
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter will briefly cover the concept of a network intrusion detection
system and cloud computing. Two technologies that have been chosen for
this project related to each concept will be described in more detail.
2.1 Network Intrusion Detection System
A network intrusion detection system is responsible for monitoring net-
work traffic on a packet level. Attacks are found by capturing network
packets and analysing them. One or several sensors which are placed in
a network for detecting malicious activities can be classified as a network
intrusion detection system. There are two approaches that enable NIDS to
detect attacks. The first is anomaly detection and the second is signature
based detection. Most NIDS use one of these methods, or a combination of
them.
Anomaly detection, also known as behaviour-based detection, is a net-
work intrusion detection system which models the normal behaviour of
the network. Should a deviation from this normal behaviour be found, an
alarm is raised. This enables the NIDS to detect new and unknown attacks,
but comes at the expense of more false positive alarms.
Signature based detection, sometimes called misuse detection, can be
used for detecting known attacks. It has a higher level of security than an-
omaly detection, but the problem with signature based NIDS is that every
captured packet needs to be compared to signatures for known attacks.
This process is time-consuming and slows down the throughput of the
NIDS. The majority of network intrusion detection systems use signatures
to detect attacks.
2.1.1 Snort
Snort[22] is an open source network intrusion detection and intrusion
prevention system. Originally created by Martin Roesch in 1998, it is
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not developed by Sourcefire.[21] Snort is capable of performing real-time
traffic analysis and packet logging on IP networks. Whether traffic should
be stopped and allowed to pass is described by a rule language. New
rules and updates to existing rules is being developed by the Sourcefire
Vulnerability Research Team (VRT). There are two main releases of these
rules. Subscriber Release is for registered users that pay an annual fee
and offer immediate access to the most up-to-date rules. Registered User
Release is for users that do not want to pay an annual fee, so they get access
to the same rules, but 30 days after their initial release.
Modes of operation
Snort can be used as a defence for a variety of attacks and probes, notably
CGI attacks, SMB probes and OS fingerprinting attempts. Its detection
engine uses a modular plug-in architecture, so it is highly customisable.
There are three main modes Snort can be configured in: Sniffer, packet
logger, and network intrusion detection. In Sniffer Mode, Snort will
read network packets, and depending on configuration, print different
information to the screen. This can be TCP/UDP/IMCP headers, packet
data, or a combination of those two. In Packet Logger Mode, packets are
recorded to the disk. Based upon the IP address of one of the hosts in
the datagram, every packet is placed in a directory hierarchy. In intrusion
detection mode, Snort will monitor the network traffic. Should traffic
match a defined rule set, Snort will perform an action based on which rule
is triggered.
Configuration of Snort
The configuration of Snort is specified within the snort.conf file. This file
also allows other snort config files to be included within it with the include
keyword. Three types of variables may be defined in Snorts configuration
file:
• var
• portvar
• ipvar
Var refers to a rule path for the different rules. Portvar is which ports is
to be included in the variable. Ipvar refers to which IP addresses or subnets
is included. An example of this is seen below:
# If you are using reputation preprocessor set these
var WHITE_LIST_PATH /usr/local/snort/rules
var BLACK_LIST_PATH /usr/local/snort/rules
# List of file data ports for file inspection
portvar FILE_DATA_PORTS [$HTTP_PORTS,110,143]
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# List of ssh servers on your network
ipvar SSH_SERVERS $HOME_NET
Snort rules
Snort uses a simple, lightweight rules description language.This enables
most Snort rules to be written in a single line. Snort rues are divided into
two logical sections, the rule header and the rule options. The rule header
defines the who, where, and what of a packet, in addition to what to do if
a packet matches the signature. An example rule is shown below:
alert tcp any any -> 192.168.1.0/24 111 \
(content:"|00 01 86 a5|"; msg:"mountd access";)
2.2 Cloud computing
Cloud computing is a set of resources and services offered through the In-
ternet. Throughout the world data centers are set up by different compan-
ies to provide cloud services. It is considered the next generation comput-
ing platform that can provide dynamic resource pools, virtualization and
high availability.
A cloud can be either private, public, community, or hybrid. A private
cloud is used by a single organization. It can be internally or externally
hosted. A public cloud is provisioned for open use for the public by a
particular organization, who also hosts the service. Community clouds are
shared by several organizations and are typically externally hosted, but can
be internally hosted by one of the organizations. A hybrid cloud is a com-
position of two or more clouds (private, community or public) that remain
unique entities but are bound together offering the benefits of multiple de-
ployment models.
Companies offering cloud services often choose to build their own
proprietary solution. This is the case for Google and its Compute Engine
cloud service. Amazon has also built their own solution for their Elastic
Compute Cloud. But free and open source solutions also exist for
companies that want to build their own private cloud or want to offer a
cloud solution to customers. The most notable of these projects, and the
one chosen for this project is OpenStack.
2.2.1 OpenStack
OpenStack[19] stems from a group of projects within NASA. When facing
the issue of how to host and process high-res images of the Moon and Mars
they decided to build their own cloud computing fabric controller. They
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wanted it to mimic the functionality offered by Amazon EC2. The pro-
ject was named Nova and is a way of provisioning on demand virtual re-
sources. At the same time the company Rackspace was building Swift, a
redundant scalable storage system. After discovering they had a very sim-
ilar technical approach to the same goal, which was to build "infrastructure
clouds", they decided to combine the projects and in 2010 released Open-
Stack. OpenStack is a free and open source cloud-computing platform for
private and public clouds released under Apache License 2.0. This means
everyone is free to use it, and to fork the code if they want.
The release proved a success and the community of developers grew
rapidly the following years. Today over 200 companies has joined the pro-
ject, including big names such as Cisco, Dell, and IBM. The components
has grown from 2 to 9 and has completed its goal to act as an Infrastructure
as a Service.
List of components:
• Compute (Nova) - is a cloud computing fabric controller, the
main part of an IaaS. It manages and automate pools of computer
resources and can work with several virtualization technologies. Its
architecture allows it to scale horizontally on standard hardware.
• Object storage (Swift) - is a scalable redundant storage system. Soft-
ware logic ensures integrity of data by replicating and distributing it
across different devices.
• Block Storage (Cinder) - is the block storage system that provides
persistent block-level storage to compute instances.
• Networking (Neutron) - manages networks and IP addresses.
• Dashboard (Horizon) - is a graphical interface to access, provision
and automate cloud-based resources.
• Identity Service (Keystone) - is a central directory of users and acts
as a common authentication system.
• Image Service (Glance) - is used for discovery, registration and
delivery of services for disk and server images.
• Telemetry (Ceilometer) - provide counters for billing customers. The
counters are auditable and and traceable.
• Orchestration (Heat) - is a service to orchestrate multiple composite
cloud applications using templates.
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Networking in OpenStack
The logical layout for networking in OpenStack is shown in Figure 2.1.
When traffic is coming from the Internet to the cloud, it first arrives at the
Network node. As seen in the diagram the Network node has three main
elements regarding the management of networking. DHCP is a standard-
ized networking protocol used on Internet Protocol (IP). Its function is to
dynamically distribute network configuration parameters such as IP ad-
dresses. This is done automatically, so there is no need for a network ad-
ministrator to configure these settings manualy. The DHCP agent allocates
IP addresses to the VMs on data networks.
The L2 and L3 agent enables distributed virtual router functionality.
This is in reference to the second and third layer of the OSI model.[8] The
L2 agent is an Open vSwitch (OVS) agent that enables distributed virtual
router functionality at the L2 layer. The L3 agent, known as the "neutron-l3-
agent", creates virtual routers that connect L2 networks. It uses the Linux
IP stack and iptables to perform L3 forwarding and NAT. Connecting the
Network node to the Compute nodes is a physical switch.
Each Compute node can consist of multiple tenants. Tenant, earlier
called "project", is basically consumers or customers of the cloud. They
are isolated resource containers forming the organzational structure within
the Compute servers. Each tenant consist of a separate VLAN, volumes,
instance, images keys and users. A user of the cloud can specify which
tenant he or she wishes to be known as, or Compute can use a tenant with
the same ID as the user. As seen in Figure 2.1 each tenant has an assigned
L2 agent on the Compute node.
9
Figure 2.1: Logical network layout in OpenStack.
2.2.2 Other cloud environments
OpenNebula
OpenNebula[18] is a cloud-computing project for managing heterogeneous
distributed data center infrastructures. First established as a research
project in 2005, it saw its first public release in March 2008. OpenNebula
has evolved through open-source releases and now operates as an open
source project. This has given it the benefit of an active and engaged
community of users and developers. Storage, network, virtualization and
security technologies are all supported by OpenNebula.
Eucalyptus
Eucalyptus[9] is an open-source cloud environment for building private
and hybrid cloud environments. The software was originally developed
at the Virtual Grid Application Development Software project at Rice
University, but further development is now handled by Eucalyptus
Systems, Inc. Eucalyptus is compatible with AWS and will continue to be
so through a formal agreement with AWS. Both Amazon and Eucalyptus
instances can be managed with Eucalyptus commands, and instances can
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be moved between them. Eucalyptus is written in Java and C, and runs on
GNU/Linux operating systems.
Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud
Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2)[1] saw its first public beta August
2006. It has since become a major player in the cloud computing market.
Running on proprietary software developed by Amazon, it is now a core
part of Amazon Web Services (AWS).[3] EC2 provides resizeable comput-
ing capacity in the EC2 cloud, hence the name elastic. Building on the pop-
ularity by the customers from early on, EC2 has all the major functionality
expected of a public cloud. Their pricing model has also set a standard for
other cloud providers.
2.3 Research in network intrusion detection and cloud
environments
As cloud computing becomes more and more popular so does research
in cloud environments. Security has remained a constant issue for Open
Systems and the Internet. Without security functionality beyond what a
firewall can offer inherent in most cloud environments, research into how
best to protect the hosted services is an area of ongoing research.
2.3.1 Bayesian Classifier and Snort based Network Intrusion
Detection System in Cloud Computing
Modi et al[16] proposed a framework using Bayesian classifier and Snort
based network intrusion detection in cloud computing. Its aim is to detect
network intrusions in Cloud environments with low false positives and af-
fordable computational cost. The NIDS module was evaluated on KDD’99
experimental dataset. The chosen cloud environment was Eucalyptus, an
open source Cloud, installed on Ubuntu operating system.
The NIDS module is installed on each Node Controller (NC) at the back
end and all types of traffic is allowed by opening all the ports on Euca-
lyptus. Scrapy is used for sending custom packets on the network. The
NIDS module is capable of detecting a higher number of intrusions with
low false positives in the Eucalyptus environment. The proposed NIDS
module is also shown to be computationally affordable in addition to be-
ing scalable. Each NIDS module can be added or removed at each NC since
the modules operate independently.
This work shows the benefits of using signature and anomaly based de-
tection techniques, which is complementing each other. Both known and
unknown attacks can then be detected in Cloud. Performance results show
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a high detection rate with low false positives, low false negatives and a af-
fordable computational cost.
2.3.2 SnortFlow: A OpenFlow-based Intrusion Prevention Sys-
tem in Cloud Environments
A paper written by Xing et al[24] investigates an OpenFlow and Snort
based IPS called "SnortFlow". The cloud environment is based on
XenServer[5] that is an efficient parallel virtualization solution. The aim
is to demonstrate the feasibility of SnortFlow to detect intrusions and
deploy countermeasures by reconfiguring the cloud networking system
on-the-fly. OpenFlow is a technology that introduces a centralized and
separate controller to enable network programmability. Intrusion detection
capability is provided Snort.
Network reconfiguration actions is not always an advisable choice, as
stated in the paper. It may kill healthy and innocent traffic. This can affect
Service Level Agreements (SLAs). It can also be costly in terms of resources
and operational complexity. But increased prevention of different types of
attacks makes it an area of promising research.
2.3.3 A Neural Network Based Distributed Intrusion Detection
System On Cloud Platform
Sun et al[12] proposed a neural network based distributed intrusion detec-
tion system. One of the challenges facing cloud computing is load distri-
bution. This is an important factor when deploying an Intrusion Detection
System (IDS). Due to detection overhead, parts of the cloud may be over-
loaded. A neural network based IDS will distribute the load so that no
single machine is overloaded. It also enables machine learning so that new
types of attacks can be detected.
According to the results, the accuracy of the implemented IDS is
shown to be high, and the time expense is acceptable. This makes neural
networking in cloud computing a promising direction of research. The
authors noted that much room is left for improving the current work. The
current dataset used, KDD, is based on every message passing through a
single machine on the network. The algorithm can be enhanced to detect
attacks that compromises several machines simultaneously.
2.3.4 Summary
Much of the research in network intrusion detection and cloud environ-
ments revolve around improving current models of finding new ones. The
research by Modi et al in section 2.3.1 shows that NIDS with low false pos-
itive and low false negative can be deployed with an affordable compu-
tational cost. Should Snort be the NIDS chosen for implementation in a
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cloud infrastructure, a combination of signature and anomaly based detec-
tion will give suitable protection against attacks.
New models for protection against network-based attacks is also un-
der research. Most intrusion prevention systems drops packets flagged as
malicious by the IPS. Some also choose to block the attacking IP-address,
though this offer limited protection. Reconfiguring the cloud networking
system when an attack is detected is a new countermeasure investigated by
Sun et al (section 2.3.2). This is a feature not offered by traditional IDS/IPS
systems.
Techniques for lowering the performance impact a NIDS have on serv-
ers in a cloud was seen in many of the relevant articles. Clouds are central-
ised units hosting services, and generate a large amount of network traffic.
An area of research here is therefore to find techniques for lowering the per-
formance impact each NIDS imposes and finding new ways to distribute
the load throughout the system. Sun et al proposed a model based on the
concept of neural networks (section 2.3.3) that showed how effective load
distribution can be done.
While new models for protecting cloud networks are being researched,
methods for evaluating different implementations was not found. Cloud
providers often have to choose between a set of different security imple-
mentations when designing their cloud. Each one usually have their own
priorities that will affect the outcome.
2.4 NID access in cloud environments
Network intrusion detection is not implemented in the services of the major
cloud providers, but options exist where developers can rent out their own
custom images through subscription models. Software installed on these
images can provide functionality for network intrusion detection. Below is
a review of selected security products sold through AWS Marketplace.[4].
2.4.1 Amazon Web Services Marketplace
Amazon DevPay[2] is a billing and account management service that
businesses can use to sell applications that are built in, or run on top of,
Amazon Web Services. Services can be sold through Amazon EC2 Machine
Images (AMIs), or desktop and web applications that use Amazon S3.
DevPay provides a web interface for pricing applications based on any
combination of one-time charges, recurring monthly charge, or metered
Amazon web services usage charges. Some of these services provide
functionality for network intrusion detection along with other security
features. Below is a list of security products sold through Amazon
Marketplace that provide NID protection.
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Alert Logic Threat Manager for AWS (EC2)
Alert Logic Threat Manager for AWS (EC2)[13] provides intrusion de-
tection service (IDS) for Amazon Web Services (AWS) through a 64-bit
Amazon Machine Image. Highlighted features are Network Security, Pri-
vacy and Control, and Management Portal and API. Network traffic are
mirrored from Windows and Linux instances via a soft-tap agent to the
virtual appliance.
MetaFlows Security System for EC2
MetaFlows Security System for EC2[11] provides malware detection,
intrusion prevention and IT compliance through a 64-bit AMI. Malware
detection is supported by geo-location honeypot intelligence, BotHunter
and Snort signature analysis. Intrusion prevention comes with advanced
analysis and reporting tools. HIPAA, SOX, PCI DSS and other mandates is
supported for IT compliance.
CloudPassage Halo
CloudPassage Halo[6], delivered through Amazon EC2 as Software as a
Service (SaaS), can be embedded in AMI or deployed through configura-
tion management tools such as Chef or Puppet. Highlighted features is ad-
vanced network access control, two-factor authentication, intrusion detec-
tion and configuration security. An elastic compute grid perform security
analysis on behalf of the virtual servers.
2.4.2 Summary
Security products sold through AWS Marketplace offer NID/IPS function-
ality to detect and stop attacks. This is beneficial for customers of Amazon
EC2 wanting to increase the security of their cloud solution. Having the se-
curity provided by an AMI hosted on a separate instance requires the rest
of the service to be tailored for it. This can be straightforward or end up
being a complex task. It also adds an extra cost to the service.
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Chapter 3
Approach
The problem statement asks how different implementations of network
intrusion detection systems in cloud environments can be evaluated and
ranked for specific use cases. This calls for a study with explorative and
comparative elements where prototypes will be created and compared in
a cloud environment. The prototypes will not be implemented in the
infrastructure, but used as a basis to test the evaluation framework. A
framework will be developed to evaluate and rank the different prototypes
for different use cases. The chosen network intrusion detection system in
this study is Snort. It is widely used and highly acclaimed, and since it is
free and open source software, no licence is required to use it. OpenStack
is the cloud environment Snort will be implemented in. Released under
Apache License 2.0 there is no restrictions on its usage. Its popularity and
active development makes it a relevant cloud environment to study.
3.1 Phase I: A closer look at networking in OpenStack
to find possible Snort placements
The documentation provided for OpenStack is not sufficient to find viable
placements for Snort. The networking therefore need to be explored in
more detail, especially how Neutron works. The OpenStack installation
used is at Oslo Community College of Applied Sciences[17], called Alto.
There are two ways to visualize OpenStacks networking. One is to map the
virtual network interfaces enabling the network flow. These are important
since these are the interfaces Snort need to listen on to capture traffic. It
will also give a view of different checkpoints network traffic pass as they
traverse the infrastructure. The other way is to map the logical network
layout in OpenStack. This shows the components managing the network
at different parts of the infrastructure. Both will be done in this project.
Once the networking in OpenStack has been mapped, possible placements
for Snort can be decided. 3 or 4 locations will be picked at different parts of
OpenStacks infrastructure.
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3.2 Phase II: A framework for evaluating Snort place-
ments
When evaluating how to protect a cloud, several factors need to be taken
into account. Some may prioritize security over all other factors, if the
cloud is housing very sensitive data. Others may have cost concerns, and
does not want to allocate too much resources for protection. For someone
running performance sensitive services, it is important that the protection
network intrusion detection offer does not come at too much of a perform-
ance penalty.
A framework will be developed to evaluate different placements of
Snort in OpenStack. Its function is to show the strengths and weaknesses
of each implementation. Scores will be given based on several factors
such as the range of traffic captured, the complexity of the setup, and
the performance influence the solution has on the rest of the cloud. The
framework will take the placements of Snort as input, and give scores on
the different features as output.
3.3 Phase III: Analyse Snort placements using the
evaluation framework
Once viable placements for Snort in the OpenStack infrastructure has
been found, they can be evaluated using the evaluation framework. This
will test the frameworks usefulness in highlighting the strength and
weaknesses of each implementation. The framework will enable different
alternatives, or combination of alternatives, to be ranked against each other.
Different cloud providers will have different priorities when it comes to the
properties of the alternative they choose. The evaluation framework need
to reflect that. The scores will therefore be weighted so the users of the
framework can choose how much each property influences the final sum.
3.4 Experiments
Since OpenStack offer limited documentation when it comes to network-
ing, it is not clear what types of traffic Snort is able to listen on when
placed at different parts in the infrastructure. This need to be clear since
the evaluation framework will give scores based on the range of traffic cap-
tured. This calls for an experiment where Snort is placed at different parts
of OpenStacks infrastructure to see what type traffic passes through them.
A closer look at the performance characteristics of Snort will also be done.
This will highlight if there is unknown features for Snort that should be
included in the evaluation framework.
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3.4.1 Experiment 1: Test range of traffic captured by Snort at the
Network node and Compute nodes
In this experiment the range of traffic captured by Snort at two relevant
locations will be tested. The first location is the Network node. The Second
location is at a Compute node. Three types of traffic will be sent to a virtual
machine at a Compute node. This is traffic that will trigger a custom rule
inserted into Snort at both locations. The first traffic is external traffic
between the virtual machine and an external computer. The second is
internal traffic between the Compute node with Snort installed and another
Compute node. The third is local traffic between two virtual machines
at the same Compute node. This experiment will show the difference in
Snorts ability to capture different ranges of traffic when residing on the
Network node and on a Compute node. The evidence that the given traffic
has passed a location is that an alert will be found in Snorts alert log.
3.4.2 Experiment 2: Measure performance impact imposed by
Snort installations
This experiment will measure the performance impact a Snort installation
have on server performance at different rates of traffic. CPU and memory
usage will be recorded throughout the benchmark. Snort will be located
at the Network node and traffic will be sent from the Internet to a virtual
machine running on a Compute node. Both CPU and memory usage are
expected to rise when the traffic increases.
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Chapter 4
OpenStack networking in
detail and possible Snort
placements
To find viable placements for Snort in OpenStacks infrastructure, the
network layout needed to be explored in more detail. The information
is gathered from reading documentation supplied for OpenStack on their
homepage.[19] Where documentation fell short a manual search has been
done by logging in to HiOAs[17] Alto cloud, which is using OpenStack.
From there, the different parts of the infrastructure could be explored and
mapped. The flow of the different types of traffic was found by listening
on different interfaces with tcpdump[23] and then sending ping requests
between elements of OpenStack.
4.1 Network layout in OpenStack
The layout for networking in OpenStack is shown in Figure 4.1. Network
traffic coming from the Internet and to the Network node passes through
four network interfaces before being sent to the rest of the cloud. The first
is eth-ex, the second is br-ex, the third is br-eth-int, and the fourth is eth-int.
From there the traffic passes through a physical switch before being sent to
the Compute nodes. On a Compute nodes two bridges, br-int and br-eth,
is connecting the virtual machines to the eth interface.
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Figure 4.1: Network layout in OpenStack.
4.2 Network flow in OpenStack
There types of traffic in OpenStack is defined: External, internal and local
traffic. This is not definitions on traffic that is used by OpenStack in its
documentation, but terms assigned in this project.
4.2.1 External traffic
External traffic is traffic between virtual machines running on Compute
nodes and the Internet, as shown in Figure 4.2. This traffic will pass
through the Network node and the physical switch before arriving at a
Compute node.
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Figure 4.2: Diagram showing the flow of external traffic in OpenStack.
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4.2.2 Internal traffic
Internal traffic is traffic between virtual machines running on different
Compute nodes, as seen in Figure 4.3. This traffic never reaches the
Network node, but is being sent from a Compute node to the physical
switch, and then directly to another Compute node.
Figure 4.3: Diagram showing the flow of internal traffic in OpenStack.
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4.2.3 Local traffic
Local traffic is traffic between virtual machines on the same Compute node.
This traffic never leaves the Compute node. It is being sent from a virtual
machine to another through the interface br-int, as seen in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Diagram showing the flow of local traffic in OpenStack.
4.3 Possible Snort placements
With the networking of OpenStack mapped several locations stand out as
good places to put Snort. The different locations should together cover the
whole range of traffic: external, internal, and local. The first location is the
Network node. The Network node acts as a gateway between the Inter-
net and the rest of the cloud. Any external network attack on the cloud
infrastructure will pass through the Network node. This placement covers
external traffic, but not internal or local.
The physical switch is another good location to listen on traffic, since it
covers all external and internal traffic. It is not possible to install Snort on
the switch itself, but traffic can be mirrored with a span port to a separate
machine with Snort installed. This has the advantage that the processing
power used by Snort comes from a separate machine, not other elements in
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the cloud infrastructure.
The Compute nodes is where the virtual machines are running. Since
local traffic never leaves a Compute node, Snort will need to be installed
here to capture it. Since there often are many Compute nodes in an
OpenStack cloud, there is an element of load balancing by having Snort
installed here. By listening on the interface br-int, all ranges of traffic is
captured. This is the interface the virtual machines are connected to. The
interface br-eth is a location where Snort is able to capture external and
internal traffic, but not local.
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Chapter 5
Evaluation framework
An evaluation framework has been created to evaluate different place-
ments of Snort in OpenStack. The framework is score based where the
solution with the lowest final score is considered the best choice among
the alternatives. The framework has three dimensions: accuracy, complex-
ity and potential performance influence. Accuracy describes what kind of
traffic OpenStack is able to capture. These are the three kinds of traffic de-
scribed earlier; external, internal and local. A higher accuracy is a positive
trait, since it is able to detect attacks from more sources. A higher accur-
acy means a lower score given since lower scores are positive for the final
result. Complexity is the number of Snort installations required in a solu-
tion. Complexity is a negative trait that will have a higher score value the
more complex a solution is. Potential performance influence is how much
a solution is expected to impact the performance of the cloud. The differ-
ent levels of performance influence will be ranked in different categories.
A higher influence will give a higher positive score, which will be negative
for the final result.
5.1 Accuracy
Table 5.1 shows that a value will be added for each type of traffic Snort
is able to capture: external, internal and local. Depending on how much
accuracy is valued, A can be set to a value between -1 and -5. This value
will then be added to the sum for each type of traffic the implementation is
able to capture.
Table 5.1: Importance factor ranking
Features Importance ranking
External A
Internal A
Local A
Sum
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5.1.1 Other potential dimensions
For this analysis framework, the different types of traffic Snort is able to
capture is included. But other aspects could be relevant to include in
the analysis. The increase in CPU load and memory usage could be an
important cost concern. The hardware needs to be dimensioned for the
services running in OpenStack in addition to the extra resources used by
Snort.
5.2 Complexity
The more installations of Snort that need to be configured and maintained,
the more complex the setup will be. Installing and configuring two
installations of Snort is about twice as much work as for one installation.
But an assumption can be made that above a certain number of Snort
installations, tools for automatic deployment will be developed. From
there the increase in complexity will be minimal as the number of Snort
installations increases. The calculation of complexity is shown in equation
5.1.
Complexity = CF − 1Snort ∗ CF (5.1)
To calculate the complexity value the complexity factor CF is subtracted
by 1 divided by the number of Snort installations the setup requires. This
is then multiplied by the given complexity factor. The complexity factor is
how much complexity will affect the final score. For some it may be bur-
densome to configure several or a large amount of Snort installations. Cost
or time constraints can make a solution with high complexity less favour-
able. The complexity value can be set to a value between 1 and 5.
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The relation between number of Snort installations and complexity is
illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Number of Snort installations
W
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t
Complexity of setup
Figure 5.1: Diagram illustrating weight relationship with complexity
The fewest possible Snort installations, which is 1, will receive the
lowest complexity value. After that the complexity value will increase as
the number of Snort installations increases. Building on the assumption
that after 3 or 4 Snort installations, automatic deployment tools will be
developed, and the complexity value only increases slightly after that.
5.3 Potential performance influence
Different placements of Snort in the infrastructure will have different
impact on performance. This is the impact on network performance and
resources such as CPU utilization and memory usage. These performance
influences are ranked in 4 categories: none, minor, medium, and major.
None means that the flow of traffic is not interrupted and the packet
inspection does not come at the cost of the resources used to power
OpenStack. An example of this is a span port used on the physical switch
to mirror network traffic to a separate machine with Snort installed. A
ranking of minor means that elements in OpenStack is used to host Snort.
These are elements there are one or few of, for example the Network
node. This will only capture external traffic and is low in terms of resource
usage. Medium performance influence is Snort placed at several elements
in OpenStack. An example of this is the hypervisor on the Compute
nodes. This can have a larger impact on performance since a wider range
of traffic is captured and more installations of Snort is required. A major
performance influence is a large number of Snort installations and a wide
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range of captured traffic. This can be Snort located at each virtual machine,
but can also be a combination of Snort installed on different elements in
OpenStack. Since a higher performance influence is a negative trait, it
is assigned positive values. The values increase exponentially the higher
ranking a solution has on potential performance influence. This is shown
in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Potential performance influence
Influence Value Check
None 1 X
Minor 2 X
Medium 4 X
Major 8 X
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Chapter 6
Snort placements selected for
evaluation
After exploring the networking of OpenStack in more detail, viable
placements for Snort has been found. Four locations has been selected for
evaluation using the evaluation framework.
6.1 Alternative 1: Snort at Network node
Figure 6.1: Alternative 1: Network node
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As shown in Figure 6.1, Snort will here be placed at the network node.
This will capture traffic coming from or are destined to the internet. The
virtual bridge Br-Ex will be used to capture traffic.
6.2 Alternative 2: Snort box connected to switch
Figure 6.2: Alternative 2: Snort box connected to switch
Here Snort will be installed on a box and connected to the physical
switch, illustrated in Figure 6.2. Using port mirroring network packets will
be copied to the port the box is connected to. This will capture both external
and internal traffic without affecting network performance. The box will
have to use a 10Gbit Ethernet network card to match that of the switch.
6.3 Alternative 3: Snort connected to br-eth on Com-
pute node
Snort will here be placed on on a Compute node listening to interface br-
eth. This will enable Snort to listen for external and internal traffic. This
comes at the expense of the processing power of the Compute node. This
is shown in 6.3.
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Figure 6.3: Alternative 3: Snort connected to br-eth on Compute node
6.4 Alternative 4: Snort connected to br-int at Com-
pute node
The Snort placement is here on a Compute listening on interface br-int, as
shown in Figure 6.4. In addition to external and internal traffic, Snort can
now listen on local traffic, which is traffic between virtual machines on the
same compute node.
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Figure 6.4: Alternative 3: Snort connected to br-int on Compute node
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Chapter 7
Results and analysis of
experiments
7.1 Experiment 1
Three tests was done in this experiment. The result is presented in Table 7.1.
Snort was installed on the Network node listening on eth5, and Compute
node 1 listening on eth7. The first test was to see if traffic coming from the
Internet and to a virtual machine on Compute node 1 would trigger an alert
on both Snort installations. A local rule was written in Snort to be triggered
on the content "testing" in a TCP network packet. The written rule is listed
below:
#-------------
# LOCAL RULES
#-------------
alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Testrule triggered";\
content:"testing"; priority:10; sid:99901;)
The setup for this experiment is illustrated in Figure 10.1. Two virtual
machines were created on Compute node 1: test1 and test2. On test1 the
webserver Apache 2 was installed with a text file named testing.txt placed
in the /var/www/ folder. Using an external computer the IP address
of test1 was entered into a web browser pointing to the text file. This
generated a Snort alert on both Network1 and Compute node 1. In the
second test a http request was sent from Compute node 2 to the web server
on virtual machine test1, pointing to the same text file. This generated an
alert on Snort at Compute node 1, but not on the Network node. This shows
that internal traffic between Compute nodes is not sent to the Network
node. In the third test a http request was sent from virtual machine test2
to test1, both residing on the same Compute node. This also generated an
alert at Compute node 1, showing that local traffic is sent directly to other
Compute nodes through the physical switch. This is presented in Table 7.1.
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Figure 7.1: Diagram showing Snort placements in experiment 1
Table 7.1: Range of traffic captured by Snort
Snort at Network node Snort at hypervisor
External threat X X
Internal threat X
Local threat X
7.2 Experiment 2
To generate traffic, a script was set to download a 1.2GB ISO image of Linux
Mint[15] from different sources. This ensured variety in rate of traffic sent
through the network. The large file size also ensured enough traffic is re-
ceived to have a noticeable impact on Snorts performance. The script used
to download the ISO files is listed in Appendix A. The script used to log
CPU and RAM usage used by the Snort process is listed in Appendix B. The
script for logging traffic on an interface is listed in Appendix C. Below is a
table of download sources selected from the Linux Mint download page for
64-bit Cinnamon edition.[14] The selected sources is presented with their
location and IP address in Table 7.2. The setup for this experiment is illus-
trated in Figure 10.2.
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Table 7.2: Sources used to download Linux Mint
Continent Country Name IP address
Europe Germany Artfiles 80.252.110.38
Europe Germany FH Aachen 149.201.240.100
Europe Germany GWDG 2001:638:60f:110::1:1
Europe Russia Yandex Team 2a02:6b8::183
Europe Sweden DF - Lund University 194.47.250.18
Europe France Crifo.org 2001:bc8:30d4::900d:c0fe
Europe France Gwendal Le Bihan 195.154.174.66
Europe United Kingdom Bytemark Hosting 2001:41c8:20:5e6::10
Figure 7.2: Diagram showing Snort placements in experiment 2
The script ran for approximately 80 minutes, looping through the list
above twice. CPU and Memory usage used by the Snort process was recor-
ded while it ran. A diagram showing the rate of traffic and CPU usage is
shown in 7.3.
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Figure 7.3: Result from performance measurement of Snort
Table 7.3: Performance measurements
Value
Memory usage (pages) 153376
CPU usage pr KB transferred during download period 0.4673
The memory usage of the Snort process was constant throughout the
experiment, staying at 153394 pages. The ratio of KB of traffic transferred
and CPU usage is 0.4673. This is presented in Table 7.3.
As seen in Table 7.3 the ratio of CPU usage and traffic is drastically
different, depending on the source it came from. This is a finding that have
implications for the amount of resources a Snort installation is expected to
use.
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7.2.1 Repetition of experiment using two virtual machines
To see if the ratio of Kilobytes of traffic sent and CPU usage used by the
Snort process changes with increased traffic two virtual machines were
used. This will increase the overall traffic sent. The locations of Snort is
shown in Figure 7.4.
Download period
Figure 7.4: Result from performance measurement of Snort using two
virtual machines
The memory used by the Snort process stays about the same, 153387
pages. The ratio of CPU usage and traffic is now 0.0796. This is presented
in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4: Performance measurements
Value
Memory usage (pages) 153387
CPU usage pr KB transferred during download period 0.0796
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7.3 Follow-up experiment 1: Sources shown to gener-
ate high CPU load for Snort
In this experiment sources shown to have a high CPU load in relation to
rate of traffic were selected to see if there is a significant difference in the
resulting ratio from experiment 1. The chosen sources is shown in Table
8.2.
Table 7.5: Sources that generated high CPU load in experiment 1
Continent Country Name IP address
Europe Germany FH Aachen 149.201.240.100
Europe Russia Yandex Team 2a02:6b8::183
As seen in Figure 7.5 the same pattern repeats where a high CPU load
is seen relative to rate of KB transferred.
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Figure 7.5: Result from performance measurement using sources that
generated high CPU load in experiment 1
The ratio of CPU usage and traffic is now 2.3606, significantly higher
than in experiment 1. The result is presented in Table 7.6.
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Table 7.6: Performance measurements
Value
Memory usage (pages) 153392
CPU usage pr KB transferred during download period 2.3606
7.4 Follow-up experiment 2: Sources shown to gener-
ate low CPU load for Snort
In this experiment sources shown to have a low CPU load in relation to
rate of traffic were selected to see if there is a significant difference in the
resulting ratio from experiment 1. The chosen sources is shown in Table
7.7.
Table 7.7: Sources that generated low CPU load in experiment 1
Continent Country Name IP address
Europe Germany Artfiles 80.252.110.38
Europe Germany GWDG 2001:638:60f:110::1:1
Europe Sweden DF - Lund University 194.47.250.18
Europe France Crifo.org 2001:bc8:30d4::900d:c0fe
Europe France Gwendal Le Bihan 195.154.174.66
By picking sources that generated low CPU load in experiment 1, the
same results is seen where there is a low CPU load relative to the traffic.
This is shown in Figure 7.6.
The result from this experiment is presented in Table 7.8. The CPU
usage pr KB transferred is now significantly lower than in follow-up
experiment 1. The memory usage by the Snort process stay close to the
same, at 153392 pages.
Table 7.8: Performance measurements
Value
Memory usage (pages) 153392
CPU usage pr KB transferred 0.3619
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Figure 7.6: Result from performance measurement using sources that
generated low CPU load in experiment 1
7.5 Summary
Experiment 1 showed the route each type of traffic takes through the in-
frastructure of OpenStack. This confirms the definitions set for the three
types of traffic: external, internal, and local. With this the accuracy of a
NID implementation can be determined when evaluating it with the eval-
uation framework.
Experiment 2 had an interesting finding. Some sources were shown to
have a much higher CPU relative to the traffic they generated. This were
confirmed in follow-up experiment 1 where sources shown to produce
high CPU load followed the same trend. Sources with low CPU load also
showed the same trend in follow-up experiment 2. Since the same file was
downloaded from all sources, where traffic originated from has an impact
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on the performance of Snort.
42
Chapter 8
Analysis of architectures using
evaluation framework
The evaluation framework will be used to evaluate selected implementa-
tions of Snort. This will test the usefulness and highlight shortcomings of
the evaluation framework. This evaluation will evolve around a scenario
where a fictional company need to select a NID architecture for their Open-
Stack cloud. They have selected Snort as their network intrusion detection
system and need to select where to implement it. The company has a high
emphasis on security, so they want high accuracy for the architecture. This
will translate to a low value for A an accuracy. They are willing to use time
and resources to implement and manage a complex solution, but an overly
complex one is not desirable. Their architecture consists of a Network node
connected to four Compute nodes. After an analysis of the different archi-
tectures are completed, a summary will follow to show which implement-
ation is best for this company. An evaluation of the evaluation framework
itself will also be done to see if a revision is needed.
8.1 Alternative 1: Snort at Network node
As described in section 6.1, Snort is here placed at the Network node
listening on the interface br-ex.
8.1.1 Accuracy
In this analysis the accuracy weight is set to -4, the second lowest value
allowed by the framework. When placing Snort at the Network node in
OpenStack, external traffic is captured, not Internal or Local.
8.1.2 Complexity
The complexity factor CF will here be set to 2, meaning complexity is less
of an issue when choosing a solution. The complexity is calculated below:
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Table 8.1: Importance factor ranking for Alternative 1
Features Importance ranking
External -4
Internal
Local
Sum -4
Complexity = CF − 1Snort ∗ CF
Complexity = 2− 11 ∗ 2
Complexity = 0
8.1.3 Potential performance influence
Evaluating the potential performance influence is challenging in this scen-
ario. The evaluation framework defines the section potential performance
influence as the potential impact the architecture will have on network per-
formance and resources such as CPU and RAM. Placing Snort at the Net-
work node could potentially have a high impact on its performance since
several Compute nodes are connected to it. The Network node serves as a
gateway for external traffic between the Internet and the virtual machines
running on Compute nodes. This makes it a choking point. But having
Snort installed on the Network node means it will not have to analyse in-
ternal or local traffic. The potential performance influence is therefore set
to medium.
Table 8.2: Potential performance influence
Influence Value Check
None 1
Minor 2
Medium 4 X
Major 8
8.2 Alternative 2: Snort box connected to switch
As described in section 6.2, Snort is now installed on a separate machine.
This machine is connected to the physical switch, and receives traffic
coming from or are destined to the Compute nodes, through a mirror port.
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8.2.1 Accuracy
When mirroring traffic passing through the switch to a box with Snort
running on it, external and internal traffic is captured. The accuracy weight
is set to -4.
Table 8.3: Importance factor ranking for Alternative 2
Features Importance ranking
External -4
Internal -4
Local
Sum -8
8.2.2 Complexity
The complexity factor is set to 2. This lead to the following calculation:
Complexity = CF − 1Snort ∗ CF
Complexity = 2− 11 ∗ 2
Complexity = 0
8.2.3 Potential performance influence
When having a separate box with Snort installed that receives mirrored
traffic from the switch, the performance of the rest of the cloud is not
affected. The box has its own resources, and since the traffic passing
through the switch is only mirrored, there is no interruption of traffic flow.
The potential performance influence is therefore none.
Table 8.4: Potential performance influence
Influence Value Check
None 1 X
Minor 2
Medium 4
Major 8
8.3 Alternative 3: Snort connected to br-eth on Com-
pute node
As described in section 6.2, Snort is installed on the Compute nodes
listening on the interface br-eth.
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8.3.1 Accuracy
Installing Snort on the hypervisor on a Compute node and make it listen to
the interface br-eth enables it to listen on external and internal traffic. This
give a score of 8 on accuracy.
Table 8.5: Importance factor ranking for Alternative 3
Features Importance ranking
External -4
Internal -4
Local
Sum -8
8.3.2 Complexity
The complexity is set to 2. Since the company have four compute nodes,
four installations of Snort is required. This is calculated below:
Complexity = CF − 1Snort ∗ CF
Complexity = 2− 14 ∗ 2
Complexity = 1.5
8.3.3 Potential performance influence
This architecture requires a Snort installation on each Compute node. This
give a potential performance influence of medium.
Table 8.6: Potential performance influence
Influence Value Check
None 1
Minor 2
Medium 4 X
Major 8
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8.4 Alternative 4: Snort connected to br-int at Com-
pute node
As described in section 6.4 Snort is installed on the Compute nodes
listening on the interface br-int.
8.5 Accuracy
Installing Snort on the hypervisor on a Compute node, and make it listen
on br-int, enables it to listen on external, internal, and local traffic. This is
the full spectrum of traffic, and the architecture will therefore receive full
score on accuracy.
Table 8.7: Importance factor ranking for Alternative 4
Features Importance ranking
External -4
Internal -4
Local -4
Sum -12
8.5.1 Complexity
This architecture requires four installations of Snort. The complexity value
is calculated below:
Complexity = CF − 1Snort ∗ CF
Complexity = 2− 14 ∗ 2
Complexity = 1.5
8.5.2 Potential performance influence
This architecture requires a Snort installation on each Compute node. This
give a potential performance influence of medium.
Table 8.8: Potential performance influence
Influence Value Check
None 1
Minor 2
Medium 4 X
Major 8
47
8.6 Summary
The summary of this analysis is presented in Table 8.9. Alternative 4
achieves the lowest score on accuracy. Alternative 1 and 2 both get a score
of 0 on complexity. This makes them the best choices if a solution with
low complexity is wanted. Alternative 3 and 4 both get a score of 1.5 on.
All alternatives received an equal score on potential performance influence.
The alternative with the lowest sum is alternative 4. This is mainly because
of a full score on accuracy, which was prioritized by the company with a
low value for A.
Table 8.9: Summary table
I II III IV
Accuracy -4 -8 -8 -12
Complexity 0 0 1.5 1.5
Potential performance influence 4 1 4 4
Sum 0 -7 -2.5 -6.5
A finding from this analysis is that accuracy have a greater impact on
the final score than complexity. With a full weight on accuracy, which
is -5, the largest score is -15. The score for complexity can only be
close to 5 with a full weight and a large number of Snort installations.
These values should be changed so they more closely matches each others
ranges, and let the weight given to each or them be the differentiator. The
potential performance influence should be changed to a weighted score.
Different cloud providers will have different priorities when it comes to
the performance of the cloud. Some may highly prioritize the performance
and will not accept much interruption, while others place it lower than the
other factors. The weight should enable the score to fall within a range
close to or equal the other factors. This requires a revision of the evaluation
framework.
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Chapter 9
Evaluation framework, revision
2
In the analysis of architectures using the evaluation framework there were
areas of improvements found. A weight should be added to potential
performance influence so the users of the framework can choose how
much they want to prioritize the performance of their cloud. The weights
should adjusted so the three dimensions of the framework have an equal
opportunity to influence the final score. It is the user of the framework that
set the weight and determine what they want to prioritize.
9.1 Accuracy
Accuracy has a weight range between -1 and -5. This give a score range
from -1 to -15. To even out the score ranges for the dimensions of the
evaluation framework, accuracy will stay as it is, and the other weights
will be change to match or closely match it.
Table 9.1: Importance factor ranking
Features Importance ranking
External A
Internal A
Local A
9.2 Complexity
The weight for complexity had a range between 1 and 5 in the first version
of the evaluation framework. This give a score range between 0 and 5,
depending on the weight and number of Snort installations. To closely
match the score range of accuracy, the weight range will here be changed
to 1 and 15. This will produce a score range from 0 to 15. The formula for
calculating complexity will stay the same.
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Complexity = CF − 1Snort ∗ CF (9.1)
9.3 Potential performance influence
The first version of the evaluation framework did not include a weight for
potential performance influence. A weight range between 1 and 2 will
be added here. The score is now calculated by multiplying the value for
each level of performance influence with the performance factor PF. This
produces a new score range between 1 and 16, close to the other two
dimensions.
Table 9.2: Potential performance influence
Influence Value * PF Check
None 1 * PF X
Minor 2 * PF X
Medium 4 * PF X
Major 8 * PF X
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Chapter 10
Analysis of Evaluation
Framework, rev. 2
To test revision 2 of the evaluation framework, a new scenario has been
selected. This is a company that need to choose between two alternatives
for Snort placements in their OpenStack infrastructure. Their architecture is
a Network node connected through a switch to eight Compute nodes. Their
requirement for accuracy is high, fearing both external and internal threats
to their services. They are willing to spend time and resources installing
and maintaining a complex solution. Their services have a low tolerance
for performance slowdowns, so a high weight for potential performance
influence will be put here. This analysis will be used to check how useful
the evaluation framework is for Snort placements not included in the
first analysis. The first alternative is a combination of Alternative 1 and
Alternative 3. This means that Snort will be installed on the Network node
and on the hypervisor on each Compute node, listening on br-eth. This is
illustrated in Figure 10.1.
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Figure 10.1: Diagram of the first alternative.
The second alternative is a combination of Alternative 2 and 4. This
means that a box with Snort installed will be connected to a switch and
network traffic will be mirrored to it through a span port. In addition
to that, Snort will be installed on the hypervisor on each Compute node,
listening on br-int. This alternative is illustrated in Figure 10.2.
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Figure 10.2: Diagram of the second alternative.
10.1 The first alternative: Combination of Alternative
1 and Alternative 3
10.1.1 Accuracy
With Snort located on the Network node and listening on br-eth on each
Compute node, external and internal traffic is captured. The company’s
highest priority is accuracy, so a full weight of -5 will be added here. Added
together, the score is -10.
Table 10.1: Importance factor ranking for the first alternative
Features Importance ranking
External -5
Internal -5
Local
Sum -10
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10.1.2 Complexity
As stated a complex solution is something the company is willing to spend
time and resources on. Their priority is a solution with high accuracy and
low performance influence. The weight for complexity is therefore set to 2.
This produces a score of 1.778.
Complexity = CF − 1Snort ∗ CF
Complexity = 2− 19 ∗ 2
Complexity = 1.778
10.1.3 Potential performance influence
The company prefers a small performance impact when selecting a Snort
placement. The performance factor will therefore be 2. A combination of
Alternative 1 and Alternative 2 constitutes a major performance influence.
Table 10.2: Potential performance influence
Influence Value * PF Check
None
Minor
Medium
Major 8 * 2 X
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10.2 The second alternative: Combination of alternat-
ive 2 and 4
10.2.1 Accuracy
In this alternative a Snort box is connected to the switch, and Snort is
installed on each Compute node listening on br-int. This captures all types
of traffic: external, internal and local. The score for accuracy is therefore
-15.
Table 10.3: Importance factor ranking for the first alternative
Features Importance ranking
External -5
Internal -5
Local -5
Sum -15
10.2.2 Complexity
This alternative requires 9 Snort installations. 8 on each Compute node and
1 on the box connected to the switch. With a weight of 2 this give a score of
1.778.
Complexity = CF − 1Snort ∗ CF
Complexity = 2− 19 ∗ 2
Complexity = 1.778
10.2.3 Potential performance influence
As seen in Table 10.4 this alternative have a medium performance
influence. The box connected to the switch does not consume resources
from the rest of the cloud, but each Compute node will have a Snort
installation.
Table 10.4: Potential performance influence
Influence Value * PF Check
None
Minor
Medium 4 * 2
Major X
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10.3 Summary
The final sum is presented in Table 10.5. The second alternative had the best
score on accuracy, which was something the company wanted to prioritize.
They both achieved the same score on accuracy, since they both required
the same number of Snort installations. The first alternative had the highest
potential performance influence. Using the evaluation framework, the
second alternative is considered the best option for this company.
Table 10.5: Summary table
First alternative Second alternative
Accuracy -10 -15
Complexity 1,778 1,778
Potential performance influence 16 8
Sum 7.778 -5.222
The framework does now include a weight for potential performance
influence so the users of the framework can choose how much it influences
the final score. The score ranges for each of the dimensions of the
framework has also been adjusted to they closely matches each other.
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Chapter 11
Discussion
An initial plan when starting this project was to investigate how different
placements of network intrusion detection systems in cloud environments
would affect detection capability and server performance. OpenStack was
the cloud environment chosen for this project, and the network intrusion
detection system was Snort. Should this have been the premise of the pro-
ject, it could have turned into a benchmarking assignment for Snort with
no clear direction. The numbers gathered from experiments would also
mostly be specific to HiOAs Alto cloud. The rules for Snort is also period-
ically updated, which also have an effect on its performance.
The premise of the project was therefore changed to develop a frame-
work to evaluate and rank different implementations of network intrusion
detection systems in cloud environments. The evaluation framework is in
this assignment used for OpenStack and Snort, but the method for evalu-
ation is transferable to other cloud environments. The evaluation of dif-
ferent implementations of Snort in OpenStack can now be used to test the
framework and find areas for improvement.
The problem statement asked how different implementations of net-
work intrusion detection systems in cloud environments could be evalu-
ated and ranked for specific use cases. To do this an evaluation framework
was developed. To test the usefulness of this framework an analysis of dif-
ferent implementations of Snort in OpenStack were conducted. The online
documentation available for OpenStacks networking were first expected to
be enough to find good places to implement Snort, but were soon found to
be insufficient.
This lead to an experiment, Experiment 1, whose purpose was to map
the flow of different types of traffic in OpenStack. A manual mapping of
OpenStacks network interfaces at various locations were also done where
documentation fell short. When the mapping of OpenStacks networking
were completed, viable placements for Snort could be decided. Experiment
2 and follow-up experiments 1 and 2 showed that the source traffic
originates from has an effect on Snorts performance. Given the large
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difference seen in CPU utilization this could have been included in the
evaluation framework. This may have been in the form of differentiating
the types of clouds by how much external traffic they are expected to
receive.
11.1 Extension to the evaluation framework: 4 types
of cloud environments
The more external traffic traffic a cloud receives, the higher the changes is
that it receives traffic from sources that generate high CPU load by Snort.
The cloud environments can then be divided into 4 categories with that in
mind.
The first type is a private cloud with focus on secrecy. Examples of this
is a bank or research institution. Content transferred to this cloud is usually
limited and from limited sources. The second type is a private cloud with
less focus on secrecy. An example of this is an IT company using a private
cloud for their internal projects. There is some restrictions on content trans-
ferred to this cloud, but less than that of a bank. The third type is a private
cloud used by different departments within a company. These departments
are mostly free to decide how to use their share of the clouds resources. The
fourth type is a public cloud. This could be the well known Amazon EC2
or Google Compute engine. The resources of these clouds are rented out to
customers who use it for their own purposes. These clouds are expected to
receive large amounts of traffic from many different sources.
This can be incorporated in the rest of the evaluation framework by
adding a privacy value. An example of this is shown in Table 11.1. A higher
privacy value will mean that the NID implementation can be expected
to have a higher impact on the performance of the cloud. Either by
influencing the value for potential performance influence, or to be included
as a standalone value.
Table 11.1: Privacy table
Type of cloud Privacy
Type 1 0
Type 2 1
Type 3 2
Type 4 4
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11.2 Discussion about future work
An early idea about this project was to offer Network Intrusion Detection
as a Service (NIDaaS) in OpenStack. Users of the cloud could then have
an option in the web interface Horizon if they want to enable NID for their
virtual machines. This would certainly be a very interesting feature to in-
troduce in OpenStack, but also has its problems. The assignment would
be a very technical one involving reading the source code for OpenStack in
order to find ways to implement it. A large portion of the time would be
spend coding and testing the code. It also has some questions related to it
about the direction of this approach. The users of cloud environments can
often be considered less knowledgeable about security than the systems
administrators running it. Important services can therefore go unprotected
without the systems administrators knowledge.
This approach would also yield one way to protect a cloud environ-
ment, and could be difficult to incorporate with other security measures.
The direction chosen for this project was therefore to evaluate different
implementations from a cloud provider perspective, not a user perspect-
ive. The strength and weaknesses of each implementations can with this
method be evaluated and compared. NIDaaS can therefore be a future pro-
ject by someone wanting to implement this. The information gathered in
this project about the details of OpenStacks networking will prove useful
information, and the evaluation framework can be used to evaluate differ-
ent alternatives.
11.3 Discussion about related work
The evaluation framework is useful for cloud providers running OpenStack
and need to decide on a network intrusion detection solution. The NIDS
used in this project is Snort, so the evaluation framework is developed with
that in mind. The evaluation framework should be general enough to be
used in other cloud environments, even using other network intrusion de-
tection systems. Some modifications to the framework may then have to be
done.
No such framework was found when searching for related literature,
so this is something new this project has produced. Research into security
and cloud environments is ongoing. Related work found for Snort were
seen to focus on improving Snort modules. Modi et al[16] showed that
high performance for Snort can be achieved while using a combination of
signatures and anomaly detection. Other experimental techniques, such
as work done by Xing et al[24], target the protection of cloud network
from another angle. By reconfiguring the network, new countermeasures
against attacks is introduced. This is interesting work for finding new
ways to improve the security of cloud environments. The work done in
this project aims to be of use to those wanting to use Snort to protect their
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OpenStack cloud and need to choose between different architectures. It is
also a basis for further work into evaluation of NID implementations in
cloud environments.
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Chapter 12
Conclusion
Cloud computing has seen a tremendous growth for several years now, and
this growth is expected to continue. How to best protect services hosted in
clouds is a hot topic of research, and also an issue more and more com-
panies are facing. This work has demonstrated an approach for evaluating
and ranking different alternatives for network intrusion detection imple-
mentations in cloud environments. Using weighed score the users of the
framework can influence the outcome by selecting their priorities. Differ-
ent companies will have different priorities for what they expect of their
solution, so the framework reflects that.
By mapping the networking of OpenStack in more detail than provided
by the online documentation, several good alternatives for where to place
network intrusion detection systems were found. These alternatives,
along with combinations of them, were evaluated using the evaluation
framework. This shows the feasibility of using the framework in different
usage scenarios.
The problem statement asked "How can different implementations of
network intrusion detection systems in cloud environments be evaluated
and ranked for specific use cases?". The evaluation framework produced in
this thesis shows that this is possible using weighted scores for the different
aspects of the implementations. The evaluation framework is open for
further improvements if new aspects of a solution need to be incorporated.
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Chapter 13
Appendices
13.1 Appendix A: Script do download ISO files
getiso.pl
1 #!/usr/bin/perl
2
3 # our needed packages
4 use strict "vars";
5 use Getopt::Std;
6
7 # Global variables
8 my $VERBOSE = 0;
9 my $DEBUG = 0;
10
11 # command line options
12
13 my $opt_string = "vdhf:";
14 getopts( "$opt_string", \my %opt ) or usage() and exit(1);
15
16 $VERBOSE = 1 if $opt{’v’};
17 $DEBUG = 1 if $opt{’d’};
18 if ( $opt{’h’} ){
19 usage();
20 exit 0;
21 }
22
23
24 ####################################
25 # Main part
26
27 my $count = 0;
28 my $time = time;
29 my $logfile = "$time.log.txt";
30
31 while( $count < 2 ){
32
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33
34
35 open(FILE,"mirrors2.txt") or die("Unable to open file: $1")\
36 ;
37
38 while( my $line = <FILE> ){
39
40 chomp($line);
41 $time = time;
42
43 open(LOG,">>$logfile");
44 print LOG "$time;$line\n";
45 close(LOG);
46
47 system("wget -O /dev/null $line");
48
49 $count++;
50
51 }
52 }
53
54
55
56 debug("script is finished, exiting...\n");
57 exit 0;
58
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13.2 Appendix B: Snort CPU and RAM usage
stats_snort.pl
1 #!/usr/bin/perl
2
3 # our needed packages
4 use strict "vars";
5 use Getopt::Std;
6 use POSIX ();
7
8 # Global variables
9 my $VERBOSE = 0;
10 my $DEBUG = 0;
11
12 # command line options
13
14 my $opt_string = "vdhf:";
15 getopts( "$opt_string", \my %opt ) or usage() and exit(1);
16
17 $VERBOSE = 1 if $opt{’v’};
18 $DEBUG = 1 if $opt{’d’};
19 if ( $opt{’h’} ){
20 usage();
21 exit 0;
22 }
23
24 # variables
25 my $PID = pid();
26 die("Snort is not running") unless $PID;
27 verbose("PID for Snort is $PID\n");
28
29 my $MEM;
30 my $time1 = time;
31 my $time2;
32 my $cpu1;
33 my $cpu2;
34 my $count;
35
36 ####################################
37 # Main part
38 my $logfile = "$time1.snort.log.txt";
39
40 my $clock_ticks = POSIX::sysconf( &POSIX::_SC_CLK_TCK );
41 verbose("clock tics: $clock_ticks\n");
42
43
44 while( 1 ){
45
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46 if ( $count ){
47
48 # printing cpu load and memory usage to logfile
49 $time2 = time;
50 $cpu2 = cpuusage();
51 my $cpuDiff = $cpu2 - $cpu1;
52 my $diffTime = $time2 - $time1;
53 my $memusage = memusage();
54 verbose("Current memory usage: $memusage\n");
55 my $pcpu = ((($cpuDiff * 100) / $clock_ticks) / \
56 $diffTime) unless $diffTime == 0;
57 my $pcpu2 = sprintf("%.3f",$pcpu);
58 verbose("CPU load $pcpu2\n");
59
60 open(LOG,">>$logfile");
61 print LOG "$time2:$pcpu2:$memusage\n";
62 close(LOG);
63
64 $time1 = $time2;
65 $cpu1 = $cpu2;
66 sleep 1;
67
68 }else{
69 $time1 = time;
70 $count = 1;
71 $cpu1 = cpuusage();
72 sleep 1;
73
74 system("rm logfile.txt");
75 open(LOG,">>logfile.txt");
76 print LOG "Timestamp:Cpu load:Memory usage\n";
77 close(LOG);
78 }
79 }
80
81
82
83 debug("script is finished, exiting...\n");
84 exit 0;
85
86 ################################
87 # subroutines
88
89 sub cpuusage {
90
91 open(STAT,"/proc/$PID/stat") or die("Unable to open file:\
92 $!");
93
66
94 my @stat = split(/\s+/,<STAT>);
95
96 my $total = $stat[13] + $stat[14];
97 return $total;
98 }
99
100 sub memusage {
101
102 # finding memory usage of perlbal by using PID
103 open(FILE,"/proc/$PID/statm") or die("Unable to open file:\
104 $!");
105
106 while( my $line = <FILE> ){
107
108 my @elements = split(/\s+/,$line);
109
110 return $elements[0];
111 last;
112 }
113 }
114
115 sub pid {
116
117 # finding PID
118 open(FILE,"ps aux |");
119 while( my $line = <FILE> ){
120
121 if( $line =~ /^\S+\s+(\S+)\s+.*eth5/ ){
122 verbose("Successful if test. PID is $1\n");
123 return $1;
124 last;
125 }
126 }
127 close(FILE);
128 }
129
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13.3 Appendix C: Traffic logger
traffic.pl
1 #!/usr/bin/perl
2
3 # our needed packages
4 use strict "vars";
5 use Getopt::Std;
6
7 # Global variables
8 my $VERBOSE = 0;
9 my $DEBUG = 0;
10
11 # command line options
12
13 my $opt_string = "vdhf:";
14 getopts( "$opt_string", \my %opt ) or usage() and exit(1);
15
16 $VERBOSE = 1 if $opt{’v’};
17 $DEBUG = 1 if $opt{’d’};
18 if ( $opt{’h’} ){
19 usage();
20 exit 0;
21 }
22
23
24
25 ####################################
26 # Main part
27
28 my $time = time;
29
30 my $logfile = "$time.traffc.log.txt";
31
32 while( 1 ){
33
34 open(FILE,"ifconfig eth5 |") or die("Unable to open file:\
35 $!");
36 while(my $line = <FILE>){
37
38 if( $line =~ /RX bytes:(\d+).+TX bytes:(\d+).+/ ){
39
40 $time = time;
41 open(LOG,">>$logfile");
42 print LOG "$time:$1:$2\n";
43 verbose("Line: $1 $2\n");
44 close LOG;
45 last;
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46 }
47 }
48 close FILE;
49 sleep 1;
50 }
51
52
53 debug("script is finished, exiting...\n");
54 exit 0;
55
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